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Quantization of the Location Stage of Hotelling
Model
Yuannan Chen · Gan Qin · An Min Wang
Abstract We use Li’s method [7] to quantize the location stage of the Hotelling
model. We present the classical model we want to quantize, and investigate
the quantum consequences of the game. Our results demonstrate that the
quantum game give higher profit for both players, and that with the quantum
entanglement parameter increasing, the quantum benefit over the classical in-
creases too. Then we extend the model to a more general form, and quantum
advantage keeps unchanged.
Keywords Game theory · Hotelling model · Quantum game · Nash
equilibrium
1 Introduction
Entanglement plays an important role in quantum information theory. Two
entangled particles have certain connections even if they are departed dis-
tantly. It is the fundamental physical principle of the famous quantum tele-
portation [1]. Interestingly, entangled particles can be used to play games,
e.g, two players are each distributed with one particle and they make their
movements by operating on his own particle. The idea of this kind of games
had aroused enthusiasm in the so-called quantum game theory. Since the first
paper about quantum game by Meyer [2], and shortly afterwards another by
Eisert [3], a series research work about playing games using quantum objects
had been done [4,5,6]. The early works showed that even if players act non-
cooperatively in quantum games, they could achieve results which could only
be achieved through cooperation in corresponding classical games. This phe-
nomenon, which could mainly be attributed to entanglement in particles, had
attracted many interests.
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In addition to quantizing classical games with discrete strategies, quan-
tizing the games with continuous strategies is attracting more attention. In
economics, games are usually played with continuous strategies, such as the
quantity, or the price of the products, or the geographical location of a com-
pany. Li et al established a quantization scheme using two single-mode elec-
tromagnetic fields for Cournot duopoly[7], a famous model in micro-economics
in which two firms simultaneously choose their quantities of products. They
found that quantum Cournot duopoly can actually get the result which only
can be gained through cooperation in classical case. Soon the same quantiza-
tion scheme were applied to the Bertrand duopoly [8] and Stackberg duopoly
[9]. And then the method was extended to research incomplete information
games [10,11,12] and asymmetric games [13].
Hotelling model, which was first presented by Hotelling in 1929, is an-
other famous model in micro-economics [14]. Unlike Cournot duopoly which
is basically about choosing quantities of productions, and Bertrand duopoly
which is basically about choosing the prices of productions, Hotelling model
is initially a spatial duopoly, fundamentally about the choice of geographi-
cal location. But Hotelling himself, had given another explanation about this
model, i.e, locations in this model could be understood figuratively. In that
sense, Hotelling model is actually about specific character of the products and
locations are used as a measure to show differences between the products on
the market and the ideal products consumers intended to buy. Besides, the
Cournot and Bertrand model basically gave robust results. We basically need
only do small adjustment if we change the initial settings in these models. But
Hotelling model is very sensitive to initial settings, and slightly changes in its
initial settings can give largely different results. Because of these odd features,
Hotelling model had more than once became a focus of studies in 20th century
and it had developed into many different forms [15]. And it is not yet a closed
model [16].
So it would be attractive to try to quantize this model. Although there
are many different versions, Hotelling model is normally a two-stage game.
Firstly the firms choose their locations simultaneously. Secondly, they choose
their prices or quantities simultaneously. Recently, R.Rahaman quantized the
second stage of this model, by dealing with a certain Hotelling-Smithies model
[17]. In this paper, we quantize the first stage of the Hotelling model.
In section 2, we recapitulate the original classical Hotelling model with
location choice. In section 3 we discuss the quantization of a certain kind of
Hotelling model, among of which subsection 3.1 is the introduction of the
classical Hotelling model, and subsection 3.2 is the quantization scheme of
the game and comparison between the classical and the quantum results. In
section 4, we extend the classical game in section 3 into a more general form
and then analyze its quantum results. Section 5 is the conclusion.
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2 Original Classical Hotelling Model, or the D = 1 model
The original Hotelling model is a spatial duopoly model. As we have mentioned
in section 1, it could be understood literally or figuratively. In this paper, we
would simply understand Hotelling model literally, although what we present
here could also be explained in the other way. Two firms (which could also
be vendors, restaurants, shops, factories, etc), A and B, providing the same
products are located on a one-dimensional spatial market illustrated as a line
segment CD of length L in Fig. 1, along which there is one consumer per unit
length. The demand of the consumers is totally inelastic and each consumer
would buy one unit product, which is to say the ”density demand function” is
D = 1 along the line segment CD, and consequently the total demand would
be qD = L. Firm A is located at distance a away from the left side and firm
B is located at distance b away from right side. A restriction 0 ≤ a, b ≤ L/2
is supposed here, considering the symmetry of the game. The two firms sell
their product with price p1 and p2 respectively, and the transportation cost of
the consumer is t per unit length. So the total expense of a consumer located
at s (0 ≤ s ≤ L) to buy one unit product would actually be p1 + t · |s− a| if
he choose to buy from firm A, or p2 + t · |s− (L− b)| if he choose to buy from
firm B. The consumer will compare the total expense, and chooses the firm
with a lower total expense. So there would be a separation point s′ on the line
segment, which satisfy p1+t · |s′−a| = p2+t · |L−b−s′|. Consumers located in
s ≤ s′ would choose firm A and located in s ≥ s′ would choose firm B. Thus,
the aggregate quantity sold by each firm is given by q1 = a + x, q2 = b + y.
Here, x = |s′ − a|, y = |L− b− s′|. For simplicity, we assume the cost of each
product c = 0. So the profit of the two firms are
u1 = p1 · q1 = p1(a+ |s′ − a|), u2 = p2 · q2 = p2(b+ |L− b− s′|). (1)
The two firms are assumed to choose locations a, b and prices p1, p2 to
make best profit.
According to Martin [15], this competition model should be standardized as
a two-stage static game: on the first stage, the two firms simultaneously choose
their locations a and b; on the second stage, the two firms simultaneously
choose their prices p1, p2 based on their locations a and b. To find the solution
of subgame-perfect equilibrium, we know from game theory that backward
induction can be used here: first we solve Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the second
stage, then we determine the NE for the first stage [18].
Since {
p1 + t · x = p2 + t · y
a+ x+ y + b = L
, (2)
we can easily get
x =
1
2
· (L− a− b− p1 − p2
t
), (3)
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Fig. 1 Hotelling duopoly on a one-dimensional line market. Firm A is located at distance
a from the left side and firm B is located at distance b from right side. Consumers located
in s ≤ s′ would choose firm A and located in s ≥ s′ would choose firm B. x = |s′ − a|,
y = |L− b− s′|.
y =
1
2
· (L− a− b+ p1 − p2
t
). (4)
Substitute the above results into Eq. (1), we have
u1 =
1
2
· (L− a− b) · p1 − p
2
1
2t
+
p1 · p2
2t
, (5)
u2 =
1
2
· (L− a− b) · p2 − p
2
2
2t
+
p1 · p2
2t
. (6)
On the second stage, ∂u1/∂p1 = 0, ∂u2/∂p2 = 0. NE would be
p1 = t · (L+ a− b
3
), (7)
p2 = t · (L− a− b
3
). (8)
Thus,
u1 =
t
2
· (L+ a− b
3
)2, (9)
u2 =
t
2
· (L− a− b
3
)2. (10)
On the first stage, we can easily found out ∂u1/∂a > 0, ∂u2/∂b > 0.
This means that firm A or B would improve its profit when it moves nearer
toward each other. With the restriction 0 ≤ a, b ≤ L/2, the NE solution would
actually be a = L/2, b = L/2.
This outcome is not satisfactory. If the firms could cooperate and both
choose a = b = L/4, they would make no less profit, with the transport
expense minimized for consumers.
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3 Simplified version of D = 1− t · |s− s′| Hotelling model
3.1 Classical situation
Here we present the classical model we want to quantize in this paper, which
is a bit different from the original model. In this model, firstly, we set D =
1 − t · |s− s′|, where s′ = a or L − b is used to index the location of the firm
while s is used to index consumer’s location. This ’density demand function’
means consumer is sensitive to the transport cost, but not sensitive to the
price of the product, which reveals the fact that even the consumer’s demand
is inelastic to the price of the products, it would reduce if the transportation
cost becomes high since it is indeed an extra pay added to the original price.
Based on this ’density demand function’, we have
q1 =
∫ a+x
0
(1− t · |s− s′|)ds = a+ x− 1/2 · t · (a2 + x2), (11)
q2 =
∫ L
a+x
(1− t · |s− s′|)ds = b+ y − 1/2 · t · (b2 + y2). (12)
Secondly, we assume the price of the product for the two firms is determined
by the supplier and p1 = p2 = p0. This is often the case if the two ”firms” are
in fact two retailers and the retail price of the products has been fixed to a
”unified price” by a powerful manufacture. As a result, A and B would only
compete on the location choice with fixed price, and the two-stage Hotelling
model was simplified to a one-stage game.
From the first formula of Eq. (2), it is straightly x = y = 12 · (L − a − b).
Then the profit functions turn to be
u1 = p0 · [a+ 1
2
(L − a− b)− 1
2
t(a2 +
1
4
(L− a− b)2)], (13)
u2 = p0 · [b+ 1
2
(L− a− b)− 1
2
t(b2 +
1
4
(L− a− b)2)]. (14)
For this model, noticing that 0 ≤ a, b ≤ L/2, three cases of NE can be
obtained as follows:
(1) if t ∈ [0, 1/L), then ∂u1/∂a > 0, ∂u2/∂b > 0, NE would be a = b = L/2.
Accordingly, u1 = u2 = p0(L/2− L2t/8).
(2) if t ∈ [1/L, 2/L], the NE require
∂u1/∂a = p0 · [ 1
2
− t
2
· (2a+ a+ b− L
2
)] = 0, (15)
∂u2/∂b = p0 · [ 1
2
− t
2
· (2b+ a+ b− L
2
)] = 0, (16)
which lead to a = b = 2+Lt6t ∈ [L/3, L/2], and consequently
u1 = u2 = −p0t[(2 + Lt
6t
− L
4
)2 +
L2
16
] + p0
L
2
. (17)
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(3) if t > 2/L, t is out of reasonable range, since D = 1 − t · |s − s′| is
possibly negative.
It can be easily verified that neither of the profits of case (1) or (2) are
Pareto efficient. Actually if they cooperated and chose locations as a = b =
L/4, they could both make higher profits.
3.2 Quantum situation
Now we apply Li’s method [7] to quantize the above Hotelling model. In clas-
sical game, the strategies of the two firms is directly determined by their inde-
pendent choice of a and b. As a comparison, in quantum game the strategies
of the two firms are determined by their independent choice of two quantum
variables x1 and x2, which have the following relationships with a and b:
a = x1 cosh γ + x2 sinh γ, (18)
b = x2 cosh γ + x1 sinh γ. (19)
Substituting the above relations into Eq. (13) and (14), we have
u1 = p0 · [(x1 cosh γ + x2 sinh γ) + t
2
(L− x1eγ − x2eγ)
− t
2
(x1 cosh γ + x2 sinh γ)
2 − t
2
(L− x1eγ − x2eγ)2], (20)
u2 = p0 · [(x2 cosh γ + x1 sinh γ) + t
2
(L− x1eγ − x2eγ)
− t
2
(x2 cosh γ + x1 sinh γ)
2 − t
2
(L− x1eγ − x2eγ)2]. (21)
Similarly to the classical model, the results of the game are classified by the
range of t:
(1)If t ∈ [0, (1 − tanh γ)/L), we have ∂ui/∂xi > 0, NE would be a = b =
L/2, and u1 = u2 = p0(L/2− L2t/8) .
When γ = 0, this interval of t would be [0, 1/L), which corresponds the
classical situation.
When γ →∞, this interval of t would reduce to zero, it means the classical
result won’t appear at maximal entanglement.
(2) If t ∈ [(1− tanh γ)/L, 2/L], ∂ui/∂xi = 0 has a solution
x1 = x2 =
2 coshγ + Lt cosh γ − 2 sinh γ + Lt sinh γ
2t(1 + 2 cosh2γ + 2 sinh 2γ)
, (22)
and consequently
a = b =
2 coshγ + Lt cosh γ − 2 sinh γ + Lt sinh γ
6t coshγ + 2t sinh γ
. (23)
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When γ = 0, the interval of t would be [1/L, 2/L], which is the same as
the classical situation.
When γ → ∞, the interval of t would expand to (0, 2/L], the whole rea-
sonable region except for point 0, and the NE solution is a = b = L/4.
(3) If t > 2/L, t is out of reasonable range, as we have discussed in 3-1.
Now we check out the quantum profit. We are able to calculate the total
quantum profit using the above NE solutions. Here we just present one firm’s
profit since the other’s is just the same.
uiq =
{
(L2 − 18L2t) 0 ≤ t < 1−tanh γL
p0t[−( 2 cosh γ+Lt cosh r−2 sinh γ+Lt sinh r6t cosh γ+2t sinh γ −L4 )
2−L2
16
]+p0
L
2
1−tanh γ
L
≤ t ≤ 2
L
(24)
In 3-1, we have already got the profit for each firms in the classical game,
which is listed compactly as follows:
uic =
{
p0(
L
2 − 18L2t) 0 ≤ t < 1L
p0t[−(2+Lt6t − L4 )2 − L
2
16 ] + p0
L
2
1
L
≤ t ≤ 2
L
(25)
Here, the whole interval of t, [0, 2/L] could be divided into three regions.
In the first region, 0 ≤ t < 1−tanh γ
L
, the profit of quantum game is the same as
classical game, and is independent of γ. In the second region (1− tanh γ)/L ≤
t < 1/L and the third region 1/L ≤ t < 2/L, the quantum prifits are different
from the classical ones.
In the second region, (1− tanh γ)/L ≤ t < 1/L,
uiq − uic = p0(2 + e
2γLt)[−2 + (1 + e2γ)Lt]
4(1 + 2e2γ)2t
. (26)
Figure 2 is the relation curve of quantum profit of one firm and γ, and Fig.
3 is the difference between quantum and classical profit (As a comparison,
the first region is also plotted in the two figures), which indicate that the
quantum profit is more and more exceed the classical one when γ increases,
and the maximum difference is achieved when γ →∞.
In the third region, 1/L ≤ t ≤ 2/L, similar analysis leads to
uiq − uic = p0t[− (−4 + Lt)
2
16(t+ 2e2γt)2
+ (
L
4
− 2 + Lt
6t
)2]. (27)
Figure 4 is the relation curve of quantum profit of one firm and γ, and Fig.
5 is the difference between quantum and classical profit, which indicate the
similar pattern as in the second region, i.e. the quantum advantage becomes
more evident when γ increases.
It is remarkable that when γ → ∞, the quantum profit arrives at Pareto
optimum. In addition to this, the consumers’ average travel distance is mini-
mized as L/8, only a half value of the classical case.
It is not meaningless to discuss the effect of t on the quantum results.
From Fig. 3 and Fig. 5, we can see that the improvement of profit by quantum
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Fig. 2 Quantum profit for 0 ≤ t <
1/L, which includes the first region
0 ≤ t < 1−tanh γ
L
(where the curve
is degenerated into horizonal line) and
the second region (1−tanh γ)/L ≤ t <
1/L. Here we set p0 = 1, L = 1.
t = 1
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Fig. 3 Difference between Quantum
and Classical situation, for 0 ≤ t <
1/L, which includes the first region
0 ≤ t < 1−tanh γ
L
and the second re-
gion (1 − tanh γ)/L ≤ t < 1/L. Here
we set p0 = 1, L = 1.
t = 1
t = 1.5
Γ
u1 qIu2 qM
t = 2
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Fig. 4 Quantum profit for 1/L ≤ t ≤
2/L. When γ = 0, it turns back to the
classical profit. Here we set p0 = 1, L =
1.
t = 1
t = 1.5
Γ
Du1HDu2L
t = 2
1 2 3 4 5
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
Fig. 5 Difference between quantum
and classical situation for 1/L ≤ t ≤
2/L. Here we set p0 = 1, L = 1.
scheme increases as t increases up to 1; then the improvement decreases with
the increasing t if t > 1. At least such phenomenon shows the complicated
coupling effects of the quantization and the travel cost.
4 Full version of D = 1− t · |s− s′| Hotelling model
4.1 Classical situation
Now we extend the model in section 3 to a more general form. We abandon
the restriction of p1 = p2 = p0, and assume the two firms are free to choose
their prices. This two-stage model could actually be regarded as a full version
of the Hotelling model in section 3.
In this full version of D = 1− t · |s− s′| Hotelling model, we have
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u1 = p1 · [a+ 1
2
(
p2 − p1
t
+L−a− b)− 1
2
t(a2+
1
4
(
p2 − p1
t
+L−a− b)2)], (28)
u2 = p2 · [b+ 1
2
(
p1 − p2
t
+L−a− b)− 1
2
t(b2+
1
4
(
p1 − p2
t
+L−a− b)2)]. (29)
To solve the equilibrium for this model, we follow the procedure introduced
in section 2: first we solve NE of the second stage, then we determine the NE for
the first stage. For the second stage, NE requires ∂u1/∂p1 = 0, ∂u2/∂p2 = 0,
and thus we can get the relation of p1, p2 and a, b. Then for the first stage,
NE requires ∂u1/∂a = 0, ∂u2/∂b = 0, from which we can solve the locations,
and consequently the prices.
However, the calculation is very complicated. Here we restricted to the
symmetric solutions, i.e. we only look for the solutions satisfying a = b, p1 = p2.
The calculation can be much simplified with these restrictions.
γ = 0 in Fig. 6 shows the symmetric solution of the location we found in
the classical games. Here we only analysis the situation when 0 ≤ t ≤ 1/L
rather than 0 ≤ t ≤ 2/L when in section 3. This is due to the fact that the
prices of the products is variables now, and the restriction 0 ≤ t ≤ 1/L is to
make sure that D in this case is positive even if the two firms choose largely
different prices.
4.2 Quantum situation
For the quantum situation, we use the same scheme as in subsection 3.2, i.e.
quantizing the location strategy while keeping the price strategy classical. For
the quantum strategy indexed by x1 and x2, we have relationships (18), (19)
presented in subsection 3.2. The profit function u1 and u2 would be derived
using the relationships (28), (29). And for the first stage, we need to investigate
the property of ∂u1/∂x1 and ∂u2/∂x2.
The quantum (γ = sinh−13/4, and γ →∞) and classical (γ = 0) results of
the location of the firms are presented in Fig. 6. And Fig. 7 is the quantum and
classical profit of these cases, which indicates the tendency that the quantum
game gets a better profit for both firms when γ increases.
The explicit form of the solutions is generally too complicated to write
down here, just as in the classical game. But luckily for γ → ∞, the solution
is simple enough as follows.
a = b =
−8 + 5Lt+√64− 56Lt+ 7L2t2
12t
, (30)
and
u1 = u2 =
[5L2t2+Lt(−40+
√
64−56Lt+7L2t2)−4(−8+
√
64−56Lt+7L2t2)]2
54t(4−Lt+
√
64−56Lt+7L2t2)
. (31)
This is the best profit the two firms could make using our quantization scheme.
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Γ = 0
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Γ ® ¥
Γ = Sinh-1 3 4
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0.4
0.5
0.6
Fig. 6 Classical (γ = 0) and quantum
(γ = sinh−1 3/4 and γ → ∞) position
for firm A and B as a function of trans-
port cost t. Here we set L = 1.
Γ = 0
t
Γ ® ¥
Γ = Sinh-1 3 4
u1 qIu2 qM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Fig. 7 Classical (γ = 0) and quantum
(γ = sinh−1 3/4 and γ →∞) profit for
firm A and B as a function of transport
cost t. Here we set L = 1.
To better understand the result, let us review the classical game. In the
classical game, if the two firms choose locations in such a way that a = b, and
yet compete in the price choice, the profit could finally be write as
u1 = u2 =
t[8a2t+ L(−4− 4at+ Lt)]2
16(2 + 2at− Lt) . (32)
This function is maximized and turned to be (31) when a and b satisfy
(30). This is to say, if the two firms could cooperate in the location stage, they
can choose their locations according to (30) to make the best profit for both of
them. Thus the maximal entangled quantum scheme does help to realize the
best profit, which is impossible in the classical uncooperative game.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we quantized the first stage of Hotelling model, e.g, the location
choice stage, to study the quantum properties of the game. First we present
our version of the model and investigated the quantum consequences of the
game. The quantum game gave higher profit for both players. And we showed
that with γ increasing, the quantum benefit over the classical increases too.
Then we extended the model to a more general form and we found again,
the quantum profit is higher than the classical one. And there is a common
tendency that as γ increasing, the quantum advantage becomes more evident.
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